A group of girls were walking home from school in a quiet Libyan town on Nov. 21, when a pet monkey from a shop jumped over one of them and retreated to the shop with her headscarf. It could have been a funny incident — people could have just laughed about it and then forgot the whole thing. But not in Sabha, an oasis city in southern Libya, where tribal tensions have been simmering with occasional violent eruptions since the regime of Moammar Gadhafi was toppled with help from NATO in October 2011.

Right after she got home, the girl, whose name has not been released, told her family what happened. A few minutes later, members of her family shot dead the shopkeeper and his monkey. News of the event quickly spread around the city, and full war erupted between the two main tribes in Sabha — Awlad Suleiman, to which the girl belongs, and the shopkeeper’s Qadhadhfa tribe, the same as that of the late Gadhafi.

It is hard to give a precise figure, but by the time tribal mediators brokered a cease-fire 10 days later, 20 people were killed while 50 others were injured, according to news reports and social media pages. Properties, including private homes and schools, sustained extensive damage.

This was the fiercest fighting seen by Sabha since 2013, when two other tribes, Tibu and Tuareg, fought a bloody battle over control of trafficking routes running from Sabha to sub-Saharan countries, including Chad and Niger.

Was this incident yet another episode of Libya’s never-ending little wars, or does it have to do with something bigger in the troubled country, where tribal relations are strong, poisonous and could easily be stirred up in deadly outbursts?

Although what happened was an act of irresponsible individuals who had no difficulty finding arms in a country with no effective government control or strong policing, this particular incident in Sabha is actually indicative of how intricate and complex tribal relations can be. Both tribes — Awlad Suleiman and Qadhadhfa — have been very strong allies since the early 1920s, when they fought the Italian invasion and subsequent colonization of Libya. They have a long history of aiding one another with another strong tribal ally, the Warfalla in Bani Walid, 180 km (about 112 miles) southwest of Tripoli.

Libya’s recent history is full of stories praising the three tribes’ patriotism and bravery. In April 1929, they led the Battle of Qasr Abu Hadi, one of the most famous liberation battles against Italian invaders near Sirte. During the Gadhafi era, the three tribes took the most risks and made the most important power grabs over 40 years.

All that changed in 2011, after the regime fell at the end of a bloody eight-month civil war. When the so-called the Libyan revolution erupted in February 2011, both tribes kept their old alliance. But as the war prolonged and it became apparent that NATO would destroy the regime, fearing rebel reprisals, some members of Awlad Suleiman in Sabha had a change of heart and joined the opposition. This left Awlad Suleiman’s old allies, Qadhadhfa, fending for themselves, particularly in Sirte, where Gadhafi made his last stand and was later murdered at the hands of the rebels on Oct. 20, 2011.

This shift seemed at the time a small crack in a long history of solidarity between the two tribes that could be healed as time passed, and people reconciled to the new fact that, with the Gadhafi regime gone, Libya had changed. However, deep political polarization during the war in 2011 resulted in a lack of serious reconciliation along tribal lines and alliances in wider Libyan society. Families and tribes were divided into two camps based on political beliefs: those who supported the NATO-backed rebels and those who didn’t.

The majority of Qadhadhfa members supported the regime, while most Awlad Suleiman members supported the revolution, mainly because one of their own was appointed as a high-ranking official in the National Transitional Council, which represented the rebels during the war. Abdul Majid Seif al-Nasr, one of Awlad Suleiman’s most influential leaders, represented his tribe on the council and later served as Libya’s general consul to Morocco. But no one expected such political differences to boil over into war between the two neighbors and longtime allies, particularly in Sabha.

The incident in Sabha is only a glimpse of how deep tribal divisions are and how seriously detrimental they could be to the whole country’s future, because the entire Libyan social fabric is based on tribal loyalty, which precedes loyalty to the state. Tribal loyalty has dominated the country for decades, well before Gadhafi came to power in 1969. This factor weakened any state loyalty during times of war and peace.

In Sabha, reconciliation and mediation efforts succeeded in bringing about a cease-fire and the signing of a tribal agreement between the two warring sides, hoping that wisdom will prevail and both sides will recall their long and shared history of brotherhood and solidarity.

But this is no guarantee for the future unless Libya unifies under a strong central government, which could exercise authority over the whole country, disarm the militias and collect weapons within a national reconciliation program. Otherwise, the recent war in Sabha could and will be repeated in other parts of Libya, where tribal grudges could easily be stirred up by a small event like the pet monkey in Sabha.

The National Oil Corporation (NOC), the Libyan state-owned corporation in charge of Libyan oil exploration, operation, marketing and exportation, announced on 13 September the lifting of force majeure – previously imposed by NOC in August 2013 – at all oil crescent ports. NOC, thereafter, resumed its oil exportation. This positive breakthrough in the Libyan oil sector, Libya’s only resource, bringing it back into track, is the result of military and security changes on the ground.

In the second week of September, the Libyan National Army (LNA) launched a surprise attack, swiftly taking control of Libya’s oil crescent, home to Libya’s main oil ports. The LNA is led by General Khalifa Haftar, appointed as commander of the Libyan armed force by the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) in 2014.

Since 2013, Libya’s oil ports have been under the control of Ibrahim Jadran and his militia –the Petroleum Facilities Guards. During that time, Jadran blockaded the oil ports, preventing Libyan oil exportation from the four ports in the region – Zueitina, Brega, Ras Lanuf, and Es-Sidra – interrupting one of Libya’s economic mainstays (oil and gas production make up 96 percent of the country’s exports and 65 percent of its GDP). Under Muammar Qaddafi, Libya’s oil output reached 1.6 million barrels a day (bpd). With the region under Jadran’s control, that figure dropped to 290,000 bpd and exports came to a halt. The NOC declared force majeure as it was unable to fulfill its international contracts. The serious financial consequences of the blockade are palpable in daily life with rampant inflation and a liquidity crisis leading to long queues outside banks and the collapse of the Libyan dinar exchange rate.

After Jadran and his supporters fled in the wake of the attack, the LNA spokesman announced on 11 September the army’s readiness to hand over the petroleum facilities to the NOC. The handover was completed in four days with NOC Chairman Mustafa Sanallah announcing the lifting of the force majeure. Four days after, the first oil shipment left the port of Zueitina on 19 September, with a second leaving the Ras Lanuf Port on 21 September. According to NOC, the Es-Sidra port is also expected to resume activities soon. On 21 September, Sanallah announced that national production had risen by an additional 100,000 bpd.

Before the LNA handed over the oil ports to the NOC on 15 September, France, the UK, Spain, Italy, Germany, and the USA issued a joint statement on 12 September demanding the immediate and unconditional withdraw of the LNA from the oil crescent region. The statement reaffirmed support for Libya’s internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and ended with a reminder that measures could be taken against illicit oil exports.

However, the LNA’s move to establish control over the key to the Libyan economy, and its consequent cooperation with the NOC present an opportunity for Libya at a time of political stagnation. The importance of these recent changes can be summed up in the following points:

First, they ended the absolute control of an amateur militia leader who Sanallah accused of trying to use the oil ports for personal gain, and for failing to protect them from the Islamic State. The Jadran legacy vanished within hours, despite the international recognition he received in July 2016 when Martin Kobler, the UN Special Representative to Libya, visited him in Ras Lanuf. At the time, Sanallah declared his opposition to the visit in an open letter to Kobler in which he blamed Jadran for the loss of $100 billion in oil exports.

Second, nine months after its signing, the UN-brokered political settlement for Libya is leading nowhere. The Presidential Council (PC) has been unable to successfully govern, and despite international recognition, the GNA and PC’s legitimacy is questioned inside Libya. The Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) voted to reject the GNA in an August session, and the political agreement itself has not been adopted by the parliament as legislation.

This political impasse, combined with the economic and humanitarian hardships, points to the need for a new path. Now is the time for the NOC to work toward reviving reconciliation in Libya by improving the economy, and by encouraging the two uncooperative government institutions (HoR and PC) to enter into a dialogue in order to ensure the flow of income to the Libyan empty treasury.

Third, as Libya’s only resource, oil can either be used as a tool of division or unity. Bringing the Libyan economy back on track, albeit gradually, may revive the political peace process. The two rival uncooperative institutions (the HoR and PC) must find a common ground to cooperate, either directly or indirectly through the NOC, to improve the economy. The NOC has succeeded in immunizing itself from political fragmentation. Like most state institutions in Libya, it became fragmented in the wake of Qaddafi’s ouster as two competing governments struggled for power. In December 2014, the Libyan interim government in al-Bayda, located in eastern Libya, nominated a new NOC chairman and deputy. The sitting NOC chairman, on the other hand, was aligned with the Tripoli government in western Libya. However, unlike other Libyan institutions – such as the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) where two chairmen are now competing for authority in UK courts – the NOC managed to circumvent this hurdle, announcing in a joint communiqué in July 2016, the unification of both companies under the chairmanship of Mustafa Sanallah, with its headquarters in the eastern city of Benghazi. In it, the company avoided taking sides in the Libyan conflict, recognizing the HoR as Libya’s legislative branch and the internationally recognized governing body, the PC as the executive branch, and announced that it would cooperate with both authorities.

However, NOC is working in a time of civil war, and under sharp political fragmentation and non-cooperative environment between the HoR and the PC. NOC is also facing huge challenges with regard to facilitating and administrating the process of oil production and revenue. On the one hand, the oil crescent area is controlled by LNA, which is affiliated with the HoR and does not recognize the PC. On the other hand, NOC is reporting to the executive branch (i.e. PC) which is still not recognized by the HoR as a government of national accord because it has not yet granted it a vote of confidence. In addition, incomes generated from oil exports will be transferred to the Central Bank of Libya in Tripoli (CBL) which is under PC supervision – a complicated operational map to understand.

In principle, HoR and PC should find a way to endorse NOC’s neutrality and independence in order to move the economic wheel. However, there is no indication of such cooperation in the near future. It may therefore be crucial for the NOC to take the initiative. This can take the form of the NOC declaring its own code of work manifesto towards the two institutions pushing them to cooperate and to respect it. The international community could be the guarantor of such a manifesto.

In sum, the economic détente in Libya may lead to a political breakthrough and push governing institutions to cooperate in the vital field that is providing life to Libya and its population. Economic progress in Libya can revive political reconciliation and facilitate a comprehensive political settlement. The UN political agreement itself can be a foundation for further negotiations and become easier to implement. By improving the economy, Libyans’ daily lives will improve, creating an environment for a better political deal.

A Libyan man walks past graffiti of late Libyan leader Moamer Gaddafi is his hometown of Sirte on 13 October, 2012 (AFP).

The battle against the Islamic State (IS) in Libya has long been seen by supporters of the UN-mediated peace accord as the quintessential shared interest that could finally unify the country’s discordant rival militias. Launching a coordinated attack on IS’s headquarters in Sirte would be a perfect way for new partners to embody their unity and engage in trust building.

Conversely, each militia claiming that only it can defeat IS and as such deserves arms and training from the international community is a perfect way for the rival militias to exacerbate the fault lines that divide them.

After Gaddafi, divisions multiply

Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011, militias have proliferated, while attempts at consolidating central governance have imploded. The forces which overthrew Gaddafi consisted of multiple uprisings – each animated by separate social and local interests – in addition to some extremists who joined the bandwagon. These forces were only briefly united in 2011 by their desire to oust the tyrant. Since then, they have fractured into mutually antagonistic components, unable to unite behind a common vision for the future.

Consequently, Libya lunges from crisis to crisis. The World Bank predicts that the Libyan Central Bank will be completely bankrupt by 2019. Most major cities are already facing electricity and medical shortages. With temperatures currently rising, there is a surge of African migrants transiting the country on their way to Europe. Assassinations and kidnappings for ransom have become commonplace. Criminal syndicates operate openly.

All this chaos promotes external interference. Western powers are eager to send special ops and bombers to attack IS, while Egypt and its allies are calling for the lifting of the arms embargo. In the meantime, they would like to circumvent the embargo by sending military assistance to their ally General Khalifa Haftar through Benghazi’s Benina airport – if it reopens.

To arrest the freefall and sidestep the broken UN process, it would be ideal if the various mainstream militias could reunite against a new common enemy – IS. A true unity government can only be forged via a bottom-up consensus, not top-down impositions.

The only real victory against IS to date has been in Derna – IS’s first strong hold in Libya. Last month, IS withdrew from the city after a year of intense battles against a coalition of non-IS jihadists and Haftar’s LNA. In fact it is the only area in Libya in which an anti-IS coalition can be said to have operated effectively. Now is the time to build on this alliance, creating a patchwork of local anti-IS coalitions across the country.

Current developments reveal this hope as a pipedream. The militia divisions which have destabilised Libya for four years are intensifying. Over recent weeks, long standing political divisions amongst the militias reasserted themselves prior to the advent of any battle against IS in Sirte – ensuring that if such a battle materialises it will be a competitive rather than a cooperative effort.

The presidential council of the UN-mediated Government of National Accord (GNA) and its affiliated, mainly Misratan, militias and the opposing Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Haftar have initiated a rhetorical race for Sirte. The Misratans and the LNA are the two main military forces inside Libya; they each appear poised to use the fight against IS to further their own dominance as well as to signal to the international community that they alone are the most trusted partner for confronting IS. This petty jockeying is likely to completely prevent the emergence of a genuine anti-IS coalition able to coordinate an attack on Sirte or administer conquered territory.

On 3 May, prospects for a unified Libyan army command to “liberate” Sirte were dashed, after the LNA clashed with Misratan-aligned forces 25 km west of Zillah – a town near Sirte. LNA units based in the town came under attack by forces allied to Misrata. The LNA managed to push back the attacking forces and has retaken Zillah. All this fighting occurred without IS suffering a single casualty.

Over the past two years a cold war between Misrata and Haftar has persisted. This drastic escalation at Zillah may indicate that the cold war has heated up and that it might overshadow the supposed “joint conflict” against IS.

Ill-fated attempts to unify rivals

Recognising the necessity to unite Libya’s militias and bolster his own position, the UN-backed GNA Prime Minister-designate Fayez Al-Serraj made a televised address on 28 April. He sought to control the military momentum of the rival political factions moving toward Sirte.

Serraj pledged that a nationwide Libyan force unadulterated by foreign interference would liberate the city from IS control. Serraj’s speech came a day after the Misrata Military Council (MMC) released a statement recognising the GNA’s presidential council as the supreme military commander of all Libyan armed forces on the condition that new military commands be appointed by the presidentla council according to the UN deal. This would assure that Haftar would lose his post.

And despite all these preparations, Misratan forces were caught on their heels. MMC forces positioned in Abu Grein 100km east of Misrata and 130km west of Sirte came under attack by IS suicide bombers last Friday. The Misratan response was a retreat.

On the same day, the PC issued a resolution establishing a special operations room for military operations against IS. Despite the convergence of military units of rival Libyan factions around Sirte for a supposed joint battle against IS, political divisions and these developments mean that the likelihood of conflict between rivals is far higher than that of a genuine assault on Sirte.

On the same day that the PC formed its special operation room, Haftar’s LNA issued a communique to all soldiers in the western region directing them to fall under the command of the LNA’s rival Western Region Operations Room. All parties claim to be interested in unity, but only if they are coordinating it and calling the shots.

This brings the number of rival Libyan “Sirte operation rooms” to three: one for Haftar’s LNA, one for the presidential council and another for the defunct Islamist-aligned, Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC). In short, as each group claims rhetorically to be leading the charge towards Sirte, in actuality no one has attacked Sirte, withdrawals from previous established positions have taken place and zero coordinated action has materialised.

Fighting for oil does not foster unity

Ibrahim Jadhran, the Federalist leader and Haftar’s erstwhile military opponent in the east, was recently replaced as head of the Petroleum Facilities Guard. The move has further stoked tensions between the LNA and the Presidential Council, which has seemingly counted on Jadhran’s political support and military control over the key oil producing region.

In the wake of Jadhran’s dismissal, the tensions between Eastern and Western Libya have burst out into the open. The rogue Eastern National Oil Corporation (NOC), which is not internationally recognised, blockaded the Hariga terminal in Tobruk on 4 May, preventing any oil from being loaded. This deprives the GNA government of much needed revenue and might foreshadow a struggle for control of the oil ports throughout eastern Libya.

Legally, the GNA-backed Western national oil company controls the ports but practically, the Tobruk-based eastern rogue NOC can deploy its loyalists on the ground. The oil standoff has resulted in a de-facto blockade of Hariga against all tankers exporting oil. As the tussle plays out, the blockade may extend to Brega and threatens to slash Libya’s exports and revenues even further.

Jadhran’s Federalist movement’s control over the oil crescent is now greatly diminished, especially after the arrival of Libyan National Army special forces commander Wanis Bukhamada to effectively mediate the peaceful cooperation of the Petroleum Facilities Guard and the army in the region. This means that the new government and the international community have effectively lost control of Libya’s oil region.

And as all sides wish to deny their opponents access to oil revenues, the Libyan economy is therefore caught in the crossfire. This makes the new government and the international community even more unpopular as Libyans face continued power shortages and belt-tightening as the elites jockey for position.

‘My brother and I against my cousin, my cousin and I against the outsider’

The “race” to Sirte is a trope used by Libya’s primary non-jihadist actors to whip up media frenzy attempting to gain international support. Each proclaiming their own righteousness, they attempt to weaken their traditional tribal and regional enemies denying them access to funds, arms and political support. No one can say if any serious fighting against IS will ever materialise. Even if certain militias do build up the gumption to attack Sirte, until a genuine coalition is formed, they are unlikely to be successful.

Western policymakers and regional states shouldn’t trust their Libyan allies’ pronouncements that they are the “man for the job” to defeat IS. Results speak louder than words. And until now, claims to be confronting IS have only been dividing Libyans rather than uniting them.

– Jason Pack is the founder of EyeOnISISinLibya.com, President of Libya-Analysis, and the North Africa Analyst at Risk Intelligence.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

Photo: A Libyan man walks past graffiti of late Libyan leader Moamer Gaddafi is his hometown of Sirte on 13 October, 2012 (AFP).

Gen. Khalifa Hifter speaks during a news conference in Abyar, east of Benghazi, May 31, 2014. (photo by REUTERS/Esam Omran Al-Fetori)

Gen. Khalifa Hifter’s star appears to be rising once again in Libya, and it is only a matter of time before we see him become a figurehead in a country that is lacking any but is eager to have one.

SUMMARY⎙ PRINT
Gen. Khalifa Hifter’s speculative role in Libya’s future is as captivating as his intriguing past.
AUTHOR
Mustafa Fetouri
POSTED
May 9, 2016
His enemies in Misrata and Tripoli have always questioned his motives and intentions, but it remains to be seen if he will be a uniting leader for a fragmented country or a divisive politician pushing Libya toward even more fragmentation.

During March, Hifter almost completely liberated Benghazi and started moving his troops to retake Sirte in western Libya, where the Islamic State (IS) has been in control for almost two years. Hifter’s troops are surrounding the city, awaiting his orders to attack IS, which has launched battles west and southwest of the city, taking more territories and small villages such as Abu Grain and Zamzim.

Hifter’s declared aim is to liberate Libya from Islamists, but it is unclear what his next step will be if he takes Sirte. The next big city on the way to Tripoli is Misrata, which has the most powerful local militia in Libya. Misrata is already an enemy of Hifter, which means attacking it will trigger longer, more devastating war in the country.

So who is this man who has been on and off the Libyan political scene for the last 40 years, shifting positions as his fortune changed from a Moammar Gadhafi loyalist to a prisoner of war to Gadhafi’s sworn enemy and — most recently — as chief of staff of the Libyan army under the internationally recognized government in Tobruk?

Born to a big clan in the even-larger al-Firjan tribe, dominant in both Ajdabiya and Sirte, Hifter was recruited as a young officer by the late Gadhafi to join the Free Unionist Officers movement inspired by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. The movement was secretly founded by Gadhafi in the 1960s and used to topple King Idris I of Libya in September 1969 and take power.

Hifter attained the rank of colonel in 1986 and became the commanding officer of Libyan ground troops in Chad’s civil war. He was captured in 1987 when his base was overrun by Chadian forces, and he was taken to Chad. Gadhafi, denying that he had any troops in Chad, disowned Hifter and left him, along with 300 of his troops, at the hands of Chadian authorities. Under pressure from the West, particularly France, which supported counter-Chadian factions, Gadhafi never admitted that he had any troops in Chad.

The United States, having already attempted many times to remove Gadhafi from power — including bombing his residence in April 1986 after accusing him of supporting terrorism — came to Hifter’s rescue with the hope of enlisting his aid against Gadhafi.

In return for his freedom from Chadian jail, Hifter was asked to join the newly formed opposition group, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, which enjoyed US military and financial support. Hifter, already angry from being left hopeless in a Chadian jail, joined the front and was flown into the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with troops willing to join him.

Hifter lived comfortably in Virginia, relatively close to CIA headquarters, from the earlier 1990s to 2011. He apparently even became a US citizen, but he never forgot his grudges against Gadhafi.

It is not clear what kind of relations he had with the CIA. Many aspects of his life in suburban Washington are hard to explain — for example, how he supported himself and his family. It is assumed that he became the CIA’s man against Gadhafi. He maintained ties with Libyan opposition groups in exile and organized military opposition to Gadhafi from abroad, but without any success until the revolt against Gadhafi erupted in 2011.

Sensing his time had come to settle scores with Gadhafi, Hifter arrived back in eastern Libya in March 2011 and played a role in leading the rebels fighting the regime under NATO air cover.

After the regime was toppled, Hifter faded into obscurity again, only to surface in October 2012 for a brief time when the new government decided to invade Bani Walid, a town southwest of Tripoli accused of harboring former regime officials. There are no confirmed reports of him taking part in actual fighting.

Hifter disappeared again until February 2014, when he suddenly appeared on TV, making a statement resembling an announcement by a military leader taking over power. In the announcement, he launched “Operation Dignity” against Islamist militias in Benghazi; however, no one took Hifter seriously at the time since he had neither an official military role nor a loyal militia to fight with him. It turned out that he was still preparing his military capabilities.

Hifter again disappeared from the scene, spending the next few months moving between al-Marj and Benghazi and trying to organize former military officers into a fighting force, counting on old loyalties among the remnants of the Libyan army and his tribal connections. He managed to cultivate political support within the internally recognized government based in Tobruk, which named him chief of staff of its infant army in March 2015.

After he gained political and military legitimacy, Hifter concentrated on fighting Islamists in Benghazi, though with little initial success. His most sworn enemy was Ansar al-Sharia, the dominant terror group in Benghazi at the time, which the United States had already declared a terrorist organization after it was accused of killing the US ambassador in 2012.

Hifter relied heavily on his tribal connections in eastern Libya and capitalized on the bad security situation in Benghazi. By May 2015, he believed he had enough force to declare war on terror throughout Libya, not just Benghazi, where hundreds of former security officials, army officers and civil and political activists had been assassinated. In a way he was defending himself since he knew that he could be next on the death list.

His offensive in Benghazi stalled for a while since the army fragments he managed to reorganize were few in numbers and lacked training and equipment. Above all, many former professional officers did not join him because neither his motives nor his objectives were clear.

However, that changed in late 2015 and early this year. In March 2016, Hifter established contact with a group of former professional officers and politicians exiled in Egypt. Al-Monitor has learned that two former high-ranking regime politicians visited him and agreed to provide him with more former army officers with certain know-how, including mine expertise and maintenance technicians for military airplanes.

The agreement included unconditional return for any former official or army officer wishing to return to Libya without being prosecuted or threatened. At least one former high-profile politician has already been welcomed back to Libya. Tyeb al-Safi, a former minister and close aid to Gadhafi, returned to eastern Libya under the protection of his own tribe.

While Hifter’s definitive military plans are unknown after Sirte, his political intentions also are not clear. He has repeatedly distanced himself from politics, but his increasing popularity, particularly in eastern Libya, might well develop into a nationwide phenomenom pushing him to take some political role or even run for president in the next elections. In eastern Libya today, Hifter is the de facto chieftain as he tries to extend his leadership role westward. Forces loyal to him already control parts of western and southern Libya.

One thing, however, is certain: Hifter is here to stay, and he will play a role in shaping Libya’s political scene within the Government of National Accord and beyond.

The United Nations’ readiness to lift the international arms embargo on Libya landed with a thud in Congress, where lawmakers were either blindsided by the announcement or downright skeptical.

SUMMARY⎙ PRINT
The United Nations is ready to lift the arms embargo on Libya. Congress, not so much.
AUTHOR
Julian Pecquet
POSTED
May 17, 2016
A grand coalition including the United States, European Union, African Union, League of Arab States and several of Libya’s neighbors came together May 16 in Vienna to endorse the coalition Government of National Accord in Tripoli and urge the UN to relax the embargo that has been in place since the 2011 uprising. Many lawmakers, however, remain concerned that blanket support for the fledgling government could lead to weapons ending up in the wrong hands and perhaps trigger greater US involvement in that country’s messy conflict.

“This is an incredibly fragile government. I hope that we ask some very tough questions before we start arming a government that’s on ice that’s still pretty thin,” said Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn. “Congress has abdicated its responsibility to oversee weapons sales. I think it’s about time that we get back into the game and oversee what has been a fairly significant ramp up of weapons sales to the region.”

Murphy has taken the lead in questioning US bomb sales to Saudi Arabia for its campaign against the Houthis in Yemen.

House Armed Services member Hank Johnson, D-Ga., another frequent critic of arms sales to the region, worried about “flooding Libya with American arms.”

Even lawmakers who are fully supportive of the Obama administration’s strategy in Libya raised concerns.

“I think it’s something Congress needs to look at and evaluate, and then decide what to do,” said Rep. Eliot Engel, D-N.Y., the top Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “It’s not black and white. We want to see Libya succeed. We want to see ISIS [Islamic State] driven out of Libya. But … I think we need to be very careful.”

Others, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, R-Tenn., and House intelligence panel ranking member Adam Schiff, D-Calif., said they’d just found out about the proposed policy shift and needed time to review it before commenting.

“I heard some rumblings in that regard,” said Sen. Jim Risch, R-Idaho, the chairman of the foreign relations panel on the Near East. “I guess I’m a little surprised that they’ve actually pulled the trigger.”

The international community argues that arming the new government is vital to restoring security and defeating IS. The new government announced earlier this month its intention to create a “presidential guard” to protect “government buildings, border posts, vital installations and VIPs.”

“We’ve called for lifting the embargo on arms to support the joint command and the military establishment,” Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj said in press remarks May 16. “We’ve called for equipping and arming … the presidential guard, which will have a clear role in fighting extremism and securing key institutions, and it’s not a substitute to police or the army.”

Secretary of State John Kerry supported the move at the same press event.

“As the communique that we produced earlier makes clear, it is imperative to put the international community’s full weight behind the Government of National Accord,” Kerry said. “To that end, the international community spoke today with a single voice on several key points [including that] the international community will support the Presidency Council as it seeks exemption from the UN arms embargo to acquire those weapons and bullets needed to fight [IS] and other terrorist groups.”

Meanwhile, arms control groups began a concerted effort to raise awareness about the risks involved.

“We know that the Pentagon lost track of about 190,000 AK-type assault rifles and pistols in Iraq. We know that it lost track of more than 40% of the firearms provided to Afghanistan’s security forces. And we know that the Pentagon is unable to account for more than $500 million in US military aid given to Yemen,” Action on Armed Violence Executive Director Iain Overton said in remarks carried by the Washington-based Forum on the Arms Trade. “What are the chances, then, of a headline in five years’ time stating that the Pentagon has lost millions of dollars’ worth of guns in Libya? And then we wonder how Islamic extremist militant groups are so heavily armed.”

Andrew Feinstein, executive director of Corruption Watch, shared similar concerns on the same forum.

“The West’s provision of arms into Libya has been devastating to the country for years,” he said. “When NATO airstrikes were launched in support of rebels fighting Col. [Moammar] Gadhafi, they first had to target weapons, including ground-to-air missiles, that the West had supplied to Gadhafi. On the dictator’s overthrow, the huge number of surplus weapons provided to him soon found their way onto the black market. Will the West never learn that pouring weapons into an existing conflict only results in that conflict becoming bloodier and longer?”

Further compounding the difficulty of the Obama administration’s sales pitch on Capitol Hill is the fact that many lawmakers objected to the 2011 intervention in the first place. Three years after the Sept. 11, 2012, death of US Ambassador Chris Stevens in Benghazi, Republicans are still probing the matter with some pinning the chaos caused by the proliferation of well-armed militias squarely on then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, now the Democratic presidential front-runner.

Those concerns are hardly alleviated by the ongoing chaos in Libya, where Khalifa Hifter — a former Gadhafi loyalist who later turned on Gadhafi — continues his battle against Islamic militants, unsanctioned by the new government. The international community flatly acknowledged the issue May 16.

“We have to cooperate on security to make possible a Libyan ownership of the anti-terrorism fight. … We will look for inclusiveness of all the subjects that are on the field fighting [IS], including Gen. Hifter,” said Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni. “But this will be something based on the authority of the Government of National Accord and on the support, the international support, to [the Government of National Accord].”

Kerry also acknowledged the rough road ahead to ending five years of chaos in Libya.

“It’s a delicate balance,” Kerry added. “But we are, all of us here today, supportive of the fact that if you have a legitimate government and the legitimate government is struggling against terrorism, that legitimate government should not be made the prisoner or it should not be victimized by virtue of the UN action that has been taken that has always awaited a legitimate government.”

As zero hour approaches for the launch of the military campaign against the Islamic State’s (IS) stronghold in the city of Sirte, competition appears to surface between the army led by Gen. Khalifa Hifter in the eastern region and the Misrata forces in the west, with the latter currently positioned in Abu Qurayn.

SUMMARY  PRINT
As long as Libyan assets abroad are not released, Libya’s many economic and social problems will remain unsolved, and the country will be doomed to failure.
AUTHOR
Rashid Khashana
POSTED
May 19, 2016
TRANSLATOR
Sahar Ghoussoub
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
اقرا المقال الأصلي باللغة العربية
Abu Qurayn is located 90 kilometers (56 miles) west of IS-controlled areas, which stretch over 250 kilometers along the Libyan coast. Analysts are concerned that this imminent military battle could deepen the split in the country.

It is worth mentioning that a Hifter representative declared the readiness of the land, sea and air forces for the battle of Sirte, which came following the declaration from Tripoli by Prime Minister Khalifa al-Ghweil, whom the international community does not recognize, that a special operations room has been established to lead the military operations against IS in Sirte.

The two steps were made following the directives of the internationally recognized parliament speaker, who is allied with Hifter, to mobilize forces to liberate Sirte from IS.

For his part, Fayez al-Sarraj, the prime minister of the Government of National Accord of Libya — which was formed as a result of the Libyan Political Agreement signed Dec. 17 — is still trying to convince western capitals to lift the ban on arm exports to his country to fight against IS.

The Presidential Council — which was formed under the terms of the Libyan Political Agreement — also declared the formation of an operations room to lead the military actions in the regions between Misrata and Sirte.

There are apparently at least three operations rooms ready to lead the military campaign against IS, which is seen as a negative indicator suggesting that the country might slip again toward civil war. This inconsistency is due to the political situation in Libya, which remains fragile despite the major steps that have been taken since the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement.

The Government of National Accord, which was the fruit of a long and difficult path, continues to suffer from a constitutional breakdown regarding its legitimacy and existence. It has yet to receive a vote of confidence from parliament, given the insistence of opponents of the political agreement to prevent a parliamentary session on this issue. The constitutional ruse to replace the vote of confidence with the signatures of more than half of the 200 members of parliament was also to no avail.

Sarraj, however, did not wait for parliament’s permission to make a series of visits and contacts with main capitals affecting the Libyan dossier, relying on the support by the majority of leaders in both Tripoli and Misrata — the support that tipped the balance in favor of the political settlement following a failing strategic conflict and infighting.

In this context, Sarraj’s top priority demands are lifting the ban on arms exports to the internationally recognized Government of National Accord, and the release of frozen Libyan deposits abroad.

The battle against IS will not be a military picnic. This is not to mention that the harsh social and economic situation in Libya amid delays in payment of salaries and skyrocketing prices, which are causing great embarrassment to the government and forcing it to find urgent solutions.

What makes matters worse is that IS has been taking advantage of this idle time to advance toward the oil crescent and take control of the oil field in eastern Libya, the Sarir field, as a prelude to attack the guards of oil installations and tighten its grip on them.

In March, an IS force attacked the Sarir field, which contains more than half of Libya’s oil. It should be noted, however, that IS has been attacking the field since the beginning of this year. The group does not hide its plan to link its positions in Sirte to the Jafara district, which includes the al-Mabruk oil field, so as to secure the necessary financial resources to fund its operations.

A military battle against IS is not likely to dissuade the group from seeking to control whatever available oil field in order to fuel the war against its enemies.

Should the two major rivals of the country — or what remains of them, Libya Dawn affiliated with the fundamentalist groups in the west and Operation Dignity led by Hifter in the east — have the slightest awareness of Libya’s best interests, they should have resorted to an agreement based on mutual concessions to counter the risk of IS.

Such an agreement is not far-fetched, as it happened last year when IS carried out a series of suicide bombings on the outskirts of the city of Misrata in the west, which prompted the city’s militia leaders to send messengers to their rivals in the city of Zintan, requesting them to stop the infighting and point their guns toward the common enemy, IS.

There is no doubt that the international consensus on supporting a political solution in Libya serves as an important pillar for successful reconciliation, which is currently being opposed by extremist minorities in the east and west of the country.

However, large portions of political parties and tribal elders seem convinced that the path of violence and infighting will tear the country apart.

The leaders of militias, which replaced the state, are doing their best to disrupt this path and prevent state institutions from resuming their normal work. One could argue that the two remaining institutions from the wreckage of Gadhafi’s regime are the Central Bank and the National Oil Corporation. Both institutions recognized the Government of National Accord and are operating under its umbrella.

This is an important factor for resuming the building of military institutions. However, the resources available to the government have considerably dropped in light of the decline in foreign exchange reserves, the drop in oil production and plummeting oil prices globally, not to mention the rise in the budget deficit over the past year to more than $18 billion.

As a result of this deficit, the government had to tighten its belt, delay payment of salaries and cancel several projects. Libya’s oil production dropped to less than 400,000 barrels per day — a quarter of what was produced in 2010.

The Government of National Accord also faces the problem of the ongoing closure of the ports of Sidra and Ra’s Lanuf in the east since December because of fighting between rival factions. The two ports are Libya’s largest.

El-Sharara oil field and the Elephant field in the west also remain closed because of the protests, despite tribal elders’ efforts to reopen them. The two fields used to produce about 400,000 barrels of oil per day.

The Government of National Accord, in short, remains toothless and powerless outside Tripoli, despite the support of many municipal councils, while the security dossier continues to be a pressing and urgent issue, along with the reconstruction process.

As long as Libyan assets abroad are not released, many economic and social problems will remain unsolved, which makes the country doomed to failure. This is while the European countries continue to call for the need to monitor the flow of irregular migration from the Libyan coast.

A man walks past a house that was damaged and looted by armed men during the three days of clashes in Imaya, west of Tripoli, Nov. 14, 2011. (photo by REUTERS/Ismail Zitouny)

On the morning of Sept. 3, 2011, my family and I headed to Belgium via Tunisia by car, leaving everything behind in Libya. NATO-assisted rebels had just entered Tripoli and the Gadhafi regime was about to fall. The revolution had prevailed, Moammar Gadhafi would be killed in his hometown of Sirte on Oct. 20 and Libya was supposedly “liberated” from his dictatorship.

SUMMARY⎙ PRINT
Following the revolution in Libya and death of former President Moammar Gadhafi, rebels spread chaos in the country, confiscating the properties of those considered supporters of the former regime.
AUTHOR
Mustafa Fetouri
POSTED
May 19, 2016
My three children attended the only French school in Tripoli, which had already closed by then with no plans to reopen anytime soon. Going to Belgium made sense, as at least the children could go to school there while I pondered what to do. A few days before leaving, I visited Bab al-Azizia barracks just south of Tripoli on the way to the airport to have a look at what had happened to Gadhafi’s home and office compound. It was a horrific experience, and I later regretted having gone. Bodies were scattered everywhere, and the place was destroyed by sustained aerial bombardment. What remained was being looted or destroyed by rebels who just got there. Gadhafi’s famous tent was still standing — and being emptied.

On my 5-kilometer (3-mile) walk back home, I came across a pickup truck loaded with about 20 corpses of dead soldiers. One of the rebels who sat among the corpses pointed to the bodies and shouted, “African mercenaries. African slaves.”

Stories that Gadhafi paid Africans to fight for him had been widely circulated, but had not been proven until then.

At that moment, I recalled the offers in early March 2011 by my friends who had worked at the various European embassies to evacuate my family along with their nations’ citizens. Right then, I regretted not having done so.

I never worked for the regime; thus, I thought I was safe — I thought. I never supported the so-called February 17 Revolution, because I did not believe there was one. However, this should not mean anything other than that I am entitled to my own opinion, since the whole revolution and bloodshed was about — among other things — me and every other Libyan expressing themselves freely. As proven by the articles I have published, I was closer to the opposition than I was to the regime; my critical writings were recognized abroad and won me an award in 2010, when I voiced that dissent inside Libya could mean serious trouble.

However, in late 2011, the new rulers in Libya were not interested in anything but revenge, looting and confiscating whatever they found. If your neighbor, colleague or even a friend-turned-enemy informed any militia that you were pro-Gadhafi, it could mean an immediate death. Welcome to Libya’s version of the Arab Spring.

After my arrival in Brussels, I heard that unknown militias broke into my apartment in Libya and that I was indeed considered pro-Gadhafi. I had suddenly become a wanted man. Right after the break-in, my neighbor across the hall had simply walked into my apartment and made it his home. I later heard from local council chairman Malik Abughrara that my neighbor justified his action by arguing that I was a supporter of the regime, which meant I was not worthy of any possessions, and that moving into my apartment was the best reward the revolution could give him, since he supported it. In the early days following Gadhafi’s death, taking homes, cars and other possessions of those considered pro-regime was a national sport.

From Brussels, I phoned my neighbor three times and each time he assured me that everything I had heard about the break-in was untrue. I knew he was lying so I wanted to go back, against the advice of friends and family in Libya who spoke of dangerous and chaotic scenes. I approached the new local council in our locality in Tripoli only to find out that they already knew what had happened. Abughrara and his colleagues assured me that once the situation would calm down, I could come and reclaim my apartment.

In 2014, I visited Libya for the first time since 2011 and met the local council leaders. They invited me and my neighbor who had invaded my home for a series of meetings over a period of three months. Their idea was that I should allow them to exhaust their mediation efforts, instead of rushing to use force to claim back the apartment. They had a point since the police hardly did their job, the judiciary was almost paralyzed and the militias were still very much in control.

After the last meeting, the council chairman declared before all of us that he would not continue his mediations and that I, as the owner of the apartment, had the right to seek other ways to get my home back. He did, however, offer his help should I need it. At this stage, asking for help in the matter meant I was seeking the intervention of one of the militias. My friends also offered their assistance, but I turned them all down believing that I should only use legal procedures, however corrupt and cumbersome that might be.

Before I officially complained to the local prosecutor, I consulted another one. After checking the file and hearing my story, he assured me that I would get my apartment back if — and this was a big if — I got enough support from the police not to favor me but just to have them do their work.

I lodged my complaint at the police station and talked to the commander colonel who assured me that he would do his best. It took the police two months to start the investigation and for officials to visit the apartment, another three months to complete the investigation and four more months to finally report back to the prosecutor — who immediately issued an arrest warrant for my neighbor.

To get the police to carry out the warrant, however, I waited nearly four months; I had to use my connections to force the police to act. In the end, it had taken two years for my neighbor to be jailed pending trial and my own apartment handed back to me.

To resort to the police was not something I had wanted to do, but it was necessary. My connections and network helped me regain what was rightfully mine. Such a corrupt system only helps those who have connections, and I wonder how most Libyans manage.

“There will be another revolution if the social and economic circumstances do not change,” said Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi on 17 December 2015, the fifth anniversary of the eruption of the Tunisian revolution in Sidi Bouzid.

Essebsi’s statements mark five years since the events in Tunisia’s Kasserine governorate.

The demonstrations, which started with the suicide of 26-year-old Ridha Al-Yahyaoui in the west-central governorate of Kasserine on 16 January, are the largest and longest wave of demonstrations Tunisia has witnessed since the revolution (17 December 2010–14 January 2011).

Demonstrations expanded to more than 16 governorates out of a total of 24 in a little over a week, with incidences of violence and looting prompting authorities to impose a curfew around the country.

The inland cities in the west, central, and south Tunisia has also witnessed separate social protests after the “Jasmine Revolution,” the most significant of which was in Siliana governorate in November 2012.

Disregard for Tunisia’s critical issues

Essebsi’s statement in last December implies that the political elite and even those in power are aware that democracy and freedom of expression and organisation is not sufficient for most Tunisians.

In fact, the political elite explicitly criticise the disregard of economic and social issues such as development, unemployment, poverty, and marginalisation.

These problems have been piling up for decades and remained the same after the revolution, which toppled former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in the midst of political conflicts.

Many viewed the youth abstention from voting in the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections as a red alert for the general disregard for the seriousness of unemployment and social justice which threatened Tunisia’s emerging democracy.

Nonetheless, such a realisation was not translated into action by Tunisian decision makers.

In fact, under the rule of the coalition led by Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda —who used to be rivals in the past — levels of economic growth decreased by 0.5% while unemployment increased. According to the Global Corruption Index, Tunisia came in the 79th place, after occupying the 53rd place in 2011.

Some of the political elite in Tunisia do make acknowledge the impact of last year’s three terrorist attacks on the economy and employment opportunities. Others, however, believe that the problem is much deeper, arguing that no departure from pre-revolution patterns of development has taken place.

Why Kasserine?

Understanding why protests started in Kasserine lies in the fact that the governorate suffers one of the lowest levels of human development in the North African state.

Moreover, the highest number of people killed during the revolution came from Kasserine.

It is also worth noting that a number of terrorist movements are based in the governorate, seeking a safe haven amid a state of poverty, unemployment, and marginalisation.

Unemployment rates reached 26.2% in Kasserine, although the national average is 17.6%. Rates of illiteracy and access to drinking water in the governorate reached 32% and 50%. In the capital Tunis, illiteracy rates stop at 12%, with 90% of its areas enjoying access to drinking water.

In a visit to Kasserine last December, the presence of an inefficient bureaucratic apparatus and anger among youth were noticeable issues.

After Al-Yahyaoui committed suicide, the government acted quickly; several officials in Kasserine were sacked and the government vowed to provide new jobs.

However, this was apparently not enough for the youth, whether inside or outside Kasserine.

The political elite in Tunisia are fully aware that security measures, such as imposing a curfew, will not be sustainable in the face of any expanding crisis.

Even after imposing a curfew, peaceful protests and sit-ins take place every day in Kasserine and in a number of areas in Tunisia, in protest of unemployment.

Tunisian authorities are fully aware that they cannot add fuel to the fire and suppress these peaceful moves.

Delays in legislation and elections

Kasserine’s uprising showed that the left’s opposition represented in the “popular front” is not ready and not willing to play a part in the current government.

To achieve the goals of the social revolution this time, political initiatives were launched as a call for a national dialogue conference between the various political factions.

For instance, the legislative initiative, by the head of the parliament, enacted a law that obliges the state to hire a member from each family in a permanent job.

There are also low hopes of funding for the international and local investors to adopt new projects. Additionally, there is weak infrastructure in the internal governorates, such as the roads, which were the responsibility of those in power prior to the revolution.

The delay in reforming the local administration and the bureaucracy shows that the democracy building process was slow to implement new laws.

Even holding local elections in the fall of this year is still uncertain.

It is in the best interest of some political forces to defer the elections, Dr Chafik Sarsar, the head of Tunisia’s electoral commission, told Ahram Online.

It is noteworthy in this context that even despite the vitality of the political parties, which number at over 200, as well as the vitality of the civil society, which has doubled to 8000 organisations, their influence does not go much beyond holding general elections at hotels in the capital and major coastal cities.

In reality, they have no influence in the villages and the marginalised neighborhoods.

Henceforth, the biggest challenge remains the incomplete political democracy that did not trickle down to development, social justice, or fighting corruption and chronic bureaucracy. 

Cairo’s policy toward Libya is driven by two goals: establishing a strong central state structure on its western border and avoiding the emergence of a political entity under control of political Islam

With a striking similarity to domestic politics, Cairo is framing its ‘Libya strategy’ in terms of a securitised approach against Islamism and Islamist terrorism alike. In that sense, support for the remains of the Libyan National Army (LNA) – to a large extent under control of the anti-Islamist General Khalifa Heftar based in North-Eastern Libya – presents itself as a logical option.

Based on a shared, generous terrorism definition between the Cairo and Tobruk governments – combined with the real need to militarily engage a jihadi insurgency spreading throughout the Libyan territory – Cairo is consistently calling for an end to the arms embargo imposed by the UN on the sovereign Libyan state since then-president Muammar Qaddafi’s crackdown on protestors in 2011.

But over the past four years, this very state structure has been disintegrating, culminating in an institutional split and generating a failing state. The lifting of the sanctions should therefore be limited to the internationally recognised government in Tobruk, considered an ally by Egypt, to help empower military units under General Heftar’s command. But with a new Libyan government of national unity potentially in the making under the aegis of the new UN envoy Martin Kobler, Cairo might have to review this stance in terms of feasibility.

However, any agreement requires thorough implementation, including support from the two opposed militia alliances, siding with either Tobruk or Tripoli. As such a stance seems uncertain at this stage of the conflict due to widespread rejection of the proposed unity government; Cairo should be able to continue its Libya policy for the time being.

Yet a closer look at the Libya dossier reveals that Cairo is engaged on a more complex approach, beyond the simple call for ending the sanctions, oscillating between mediation, intervention and containment. This variance is not only an expression of conflicting views, and methods, of the foreign ministry and the presidency, but also reflects Egypt’s obligatory insertion of preferences of the international community, including the strictly non-interventionist Algerian position. Algeria opposed military intervention against Qaddafi in the League of Arab States in 2011 and continues to this day to reject any armed interference in the Libyan setting.

Lately this preference has been given to the diplomatic process for a negotiated political solution under the helm of the UN. However, having suffered the rejection of the proposal for the ‘Government of National Accord’ by both conflict parties in October, the efforts of the previous UN special envoy Bernardino Léon for building a viable and representative political structure ex nihilo have not been producing tangible results to date.

External support for allies or proxies such as the LNA, stealthily or more openly, might thus increase. Nevertheless, despite the bleak outlook for a political solution, the negotiation process has been endorsed and is still rhetorically supported by the Egyptian foreign minister Sameh Shoukry.

In real terms, the current Libyan setting increasingly comes down to managing chaos. Resulting from a controversial R2P (Responsibility to Protect) intervention, the implications of an ongoing low-intensity conflict and a lacking intra-Libyan political consensus amounting to a self-destructive attitude, even the neighbouring countries are feeling the negative externalities of political instability and a growing jihadi nexus. Following in the footsteps of the LIFG (Libyan Islamic Fighting Group) and the disproportionate role of Libyans in the former Iraqi core-ISIS, the local Libyan ISIS avatar is part of a powerful international jihadi network, reaching out to the local insurgency in Sinai. Understandably, the Egyptian authorities perceive a double geographical threat, both on its north-eastern flank (in the Sinai Peninsula) and along the highly porous 1,100 km border with Libya. Hence, the Libya dossier is primarily considered from a national security perspective, and less from the diplomatic perspective for a negotiated peace deal.

Therefore, in addition to facing severe cuts in remittances from Egyptian workers in Libya, whose numbers dwindled down to less than a quarter of the previous expat population (reaching less than half-a-million), security considerations have become of overwhelming significance.

The strategic goals for Cairo remain pre-empting the presence of either an utterly failed – or of a Muslim Brotherhood controlled state – on its very border. In light of these interests, the declared Egyptian foreign policy position has been to support the UN National Dialogue process to achieve a political settlement between the Libyan factions, vying for control of Africa’s largest proven oil reserves and opposed on fundamental ideological differences over a future social contract.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian Armed Forces have opted for a combination of deterrence and containment. By building up their land and air presence along the western frontier, intrusions into Egyptian territory should be foiled.

In addition, the sealing of the border by the erection of a border fence is a second pragmatic step to control the flow of illicit trade. Agreement on a comprehensive border surveillance system was reached with the United States in June last year. At Egypt’s request, the Pentagon’s DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency) has given the green light for the construction of a border control facility. In light of the halted EU BAM (Border Assistance Mission) in Libya, and the lack of professional border policing on the Libyan side, this containment approach should help permeating the border.

A third effort to stem the flow of illicit trans-border trade includes tribal politics, an endeavour firmly under control of the Armed Forces. The idea is basically to bring the Egyptian Awlad Ali tribe closer to the official authorities, in addition to nurturing good relations with their kin on the Libyan side of the border, the Obeydat. But following many years of neglect and the existence of real economic grievances, the perception of discrimination and of economic exclusion (mainly from the windfalls of the regional oil and gas industry) will not be easy and quick to overcome. Tribal pact-making is therefore more a work-in-progress than a firm and reliable feature of a strategy to seal-off a problematic border.

The main question that Cairo will need to answer at some point is whether General Heftar can be considered an asset for its approach to the Libyan neighbour. For the time being, the non-military approach favoured by the Egyptian foreign ministry seems to have won over the previously bellicose rhetoric of Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, who first called for an international military coalition in February 2015 and then worked, without success, to mobilise the League of Arab States to that end.

Soberly assessing the effect of Heftar’s ‘Operation Dignity,’ and its most recent follow-up ‘Hatf’ (literally ‘death’), will therefore be decisive. Have these endeavours led to coalition building among previously scattered jihadi militias, for example under the banner of ISIS? Or have they been capable of structurally weakening the territorial control of jihadist actors?

In other words, is the assumed Egyptian power projection by proxy working out in Cairo’s favour by making the Egyptian-Libyan border more secure and ridding its Libyan hinterland of jihadi insurgents? The most recent agreement with the US on border security points in another direction, and indicates that a multi-pronged approach is the smartest option for the moment.

Nevertheless, as Libya is pretty much embarked on a path towards Somalisation, Egypt needs to consider a ‘Plan B’ should the UN-brokered Libyan National Dialogue eventually fail for good. Since several indicators are pointing in this direction, the primarily non-kinetic approach to crisis management in Libya privileged by the Egyptian authorities and Cairo’s diplomacy might turn out as obsolete. Hence the previous stance, vocally expressed by President El-Sisi last February of favouring direct military engagement might return to the top of the agenda.

In the meantime Cairo will continue to steer a complex approach between conflict containment, tribal politics and indirect power-projection via proxy in order to secure a porous border and avoid jihadi spill-over.

A general view shows the damage at the scene of an explosion at the Police Training Center in the town of Zliten, Libya, January 7, 2016. (Reuters)

Libya’s Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) branch has expanded its grip on Libyan territory through multiple parallel tactics and the sluggish pace of negotiations between the feuding governments in Tripoli and Beida has contributed to this expansion. The confrontation between the two factions has led to a paralysis in the capacity of legitimate forces to combat the expansion of terrorist organizations in many parts of the country. The UN-mediated agreement signed by some representatives of the two parliaments, political parties, civil society, local government, and other stakeholders in the Moroccan city of Skhirat in December establishing a Government of National Accord (GNA) has not been universally accepted in Libya. Doubts remain over whether this government can ever establish itself in the Libyan capital of Tripoli. ISIS is taking advantage of this state of anarchy and confusion to carry out a sophisticated strategy to establish itself in the territory.

After local rivalries and tribal dynamics obstructed the ISIS attempts to control the eastern city of Derna, the group moved to the central coastal city of Sirte. Showing a capacity to learn from their previous experience in Derna, the leadership of the Islamist group has instead chosen to take advantage of the local dynamic rather than trying to dominate it. As the hometown of former Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi, Sirte plays host to most of the loyalist tribes. When not directly antagonizing them, the new post-revolutionary elite have largely marginalized these tribes and blocked access to the political process. ISIS has exploited their malcontent and resentment against the new political system to build consensus for its penetration and expansion into the strategically located city in central Libya. After establishing itself through a mix of imposing order and security in town and brutality against its opponents, the terrorist organization has proceeded to ensure the survival, and indeed the expansion, of its territory.

ISIS has based its strategy on three tactical pillars. The first involves instilling fear in its opponents in Tripoli and in Tobruk. It has succeeded through a series of car bombs and suicide bombings against selected targets in the territories controlled by the two governments. This tactic remains an ongoing part of the general strategy and will likely continue with increasing levels of bloodshed.

The second pillar involves developing connections with the criminal organizations mushrooming in Libya, both in the southern desert region as well as in the coastal areas, as criminal and Islamist interests coincide. The recent bloody truck bomb attack against the coast guard barracks in Zliten demonstrates this convergence. Zliten is a major center for the smuggling of migrants and goods. ISIS would resist any attempt by the Tripoli government, with which the Zliten city council is allied, to combat criminal organizations. The murder of the city’s Counter-Criminal Agency director on December 29 and the attack against the coast guard recruits who were receiving training to combat smugglers both weakens government control and law enforcement over the area. This second pillar of ISIS’ strategy is the most dangerous one, combining the territorial control of emerging criminal gangs with the military capacity of a terrorist organization that does not shy from adopting the most brutal tactics to reach its objectives.

The third pillar of the ISIS strategy involves the classical expansion through rapid and devastating attacks against its enemies. The operations against the oil installations of Sidra, Brega, and Ras Lanuf, are part of this more direct strategy. The attacks are not meant to occupy the oil structures to control them and sell the oil abroad as the mother organization is doing in Syria and Iraq. Thanks to the Western and international blockade, no actor can sell Libyan oil outside of the official channels. Rather, ISIS means to destroy Libya’s infrastructure to prevent the country’s legitimate institutions from utilizing the resources and obtaining revenues vital for the reconstruction of the country. By degrading its enemy, the terrorist organization achieves elements of the first two pillars. If achieving this goal is accompanied by additional territorial acquisitions—such as in the conquest of the Ben Jawad village—all the better.

The Libyan political factions and the international community will face many difficulties before they can establish the necessary order and stability to adequately confront ISIS in Libya. To even begin to reverse the negative trend in which the country has plunged, the main Libyan factions must put aside their differences, rivalries, and jealousies and agree to work together. ISIS and other terrorist and criminal organizations have begun entrenching themselves in the country, requiring immediate and effective strategies to confront them. The GNA could, despite the flaws that have accompanied its inception, provide a point around which to rally Libyan forces and Western support. While essential, constructive international support needs an invitation and a plan from the legitimate Libyan authorities. Prime Minister-designate Fayez Serraj can use this opportunity to demonstrates the necessary attributes for this role: the courage to go to Tripoli and install his government, despite the threats, the leadership to coalesce the Libyan factions around his government, and the wisdom to request the international support needed to defeat the enemies of peace, legality, and democratization.

Karim Mezran is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East focusing on North Africa.