Recently inked agreements between Turkey and Libya have some of their neighbors fuming, especially as Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) on Dec. 19 accepted Turkey’s offer of military assistance in the battle against its rival.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi had reiterated Egypt’s support Dec. 16 for the GNA’s rival, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by eastern military commander Gen. Khalifa Hifter. Sisi said Libyan events affect Egypt’s national security and “some countries are interfering to delay a political solution in the country.” This statement came after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered GNA leader Fayez al-Sarraj military aid, including ground troops, under an agreement signed last month. Sarraj officially accepted Dec. 19.

The GNA Presidential Council responded to Sisi’s statements by saying the GNA “understands the right of the Egyptian government to national security, but it does not accept any threats to Libyan sovereignty.” Sarraj added, “We hope Egypt will play a pivotal role in gaining everybody’s trust in the framework of supporting civil peace and stability in Libya.”

Hifter’s LNA has been leading an offensive against the GNA in Tripoli since April. On Dec. 12, Hifter announced the “final battle” for the capital.

The GNA and Turkey also signed another pact last month that is strongly opposed by Egypt along with Cyprus, Greece and the European Union: a maritime delimitation agreement. Critics see that deal as Turkey’s way of overriding objections to its gas exploration efforts in the Mediterranean Sea.

In a Nov. 28 statement, Egypt’s Foreign Ministry described the agreement as “illegitimate and without impact on the rights of the Mediterranean riparian countries.”

Ahmad Youssef Ahmad, a political science professor at the University of Cairo and former dean of the Arab Institute of Research and Studies, justified Egypt’s criticism of the GNA by telling Al-Monitor the Libya-Turkey agreements “directly threaten Egyptian security and interests.”

“The delimitation agreement that goes against Egypt’s interests in the Mediterranean’s wealth, and the Turkish insinuation of military intervention in Libya, are dangerous developments that require a significant change in Egypt’s policies,” he said.

Claudia Gazzini, a senior Libyan analyst in the International Crisis Group, told Al-Monitor the maritime agreement angers Egypt because it confirms Turkey’s stance in the conflict over gas exploration and drilling in the Middle East.

She said, “It was not only this agreement that angered Egypt, but also the second agreement with the GNA over security and military support, under which Turkey would offer Sarraj’s government training, consultations and equipment, and Tripoli can ask Turkey for field aid, if necessary. This would pave the way for direct Turkish intervention in Libya, which Egypt rejects.”

Egyptian parliament Speaker Ali Abdul Aal said during a recent session that Egypt considers the Libyan parliament in Tobruk, which is affiliated with the eastern-based government that opposes the GNA, the only legitimate entity that represents the Libyan people.

Gazzini added, “Egypt’s recognition of the legitimacy of the [Tobruk] parliament is just an attempt to transfer the legitimate power in Libya from the GNA to the Libyan parliament and to undermine the two agreements signed between Sarraj and Turkey. Egypt will continue its attempts to nullify these agreements.”

On Dec. 18, Egypt submitted a letter to the UN Security Council saying the agreement between Turkey and the GNA violates the council’s resolutions regarding Libya and allows the transfer of weapons to armed militias in western Libya. The UN has imposed an arms embargo on Libya since 2011.

Speaking to Al-Monitor by phone, Egyptian former Assistant Foreign Minister Hussein Haridi called on the UN to take quick action regarding the situation in Libya. “The security council and the UN have to live up to their responsibilities and face the deteriorating situation in Libya before it explodes,” he said. “Egypt will defend its sovereignty, rights, interests and borders relentlessly and fearlessly, in case its interests in the Mediterranean Sea are jeopardized or face security and military threats.”

The stance of the Libyan diplomatic mission in Egypt sparked controversy. Egyptian and Arab media reported that the mission issued a statement Dec. 14 saying it was defecting from the GNA and siding instead with Hifter and the Libyan parliament. The next day, however, the Libyan Embassy in Cairo completely denied the claim, saying the statement had been forged.

Then, on Dec. 15, the Libyan Embassy said it was suspending work indefinitely for security reasons, which it did not reveal.

Gazzini said, “Egypt and other countries in the region have undoubtedly tried to withdraw legitimacy from the GNA. However, this will be a tough task. The UN’s recognition of the legitimacy of Sarraj’s government cannot be eliminated, since the Libyan parliament [in Tripoli] disintegrated and cannot vote on forming a new government.”

Italy’s Senate speaker Elizabetta Casellati on Wednesday backed “crucial” efforts by the United Nations to resolve Libya’s escalating conflict, amid fears of a slide into all-out civil war.

“Tensions and instability are growing by the day in the Mediterranean region and the situation in Libya is clear evidence of this,” Casellati told the Senate ahead of an address by United Nations chief Antonio Guterres.

The UN is playing a “crucial” role in Libya, where its special envoy Ghassan Salame is carrying out “serious and precious” groundwork for a political process leading to a peace settlement,” Castellati said.

A deadly battle for Tripoli began in early April between militias allied with the internationally recognised unity government and the forces of eastern warlord Khalifa Haftar, who launched a military assault on the capital.

Oil-rich Libya has had rival administrations in the east and west of the country since 2014 and has been in turmoil since the Nato-backed ouster of late dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) has been trying since April to take Tripoli, part of a power struggle in the oil producing nation since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

He is backed by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and most recently Russian mercenaries, according to diplomats and Tripoli officials. The LNA denies it has foreign backing.

“The United States calls on the ‘Libyan National Army’ to end its offensive on Tripoli,” the U.S. State Department said in statement late on Thursday after a visit to Washington by the Tripoli-based foreign and interior ministers.

Both sides launched a U.S.-Libyan security dialogue.

“The U.S. delegation, representing a number of U.S. government agencies, underscored support for Libya’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russia’s attempts to exploit the conflict against the will of the Libyan people,” the statement said.

It was the strongest U.S. statement since Russian mercenaries were first sighted in Tripoli in September fighting alongside the LNA, which is allied to a parallel government in eastern Libya.

President Donald Trump called Haftar in the first weeks of the offensive, which has failed to breach Tripoli’s defenses, in a move that some diplomats took as sign Washington might be backing the former Gaddafi officer.

Trump “recognized Field Marshal Haftar’s significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya’s oil resources, and the two discussed a shared vision for Libya’s transition to a stable, democratic political system,” the White House said at the time.

A parallel central bank in eastern Libya received increased deliveries of new banknotes from Russia this year, Russian customs data showed last month.

While Russia has provided Haftar with support, it has simultaneously cultivated relations with the internationally recognized Government of National Accord in Tripoli.

The story of how the Tunisian revolution began is well known. On December 17, 2010, a 26-year-old fruit vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi from the town of Sidi Bouzid set himself on fire outside a local government building. The man’s self-immolation—an act of protest against repeated mistreatment by police and local officials—sparked protests that quickly spread across the country. Within a few weeks, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali had stepped down and fled the country after 23 years in power, offering Tunisia an unprecedented opportunity for a democratic opening. A massive wave of uprisings soon swept the country’s neighbors, reaching all the way to the Levant and the Persian Gulf.

Less well known is what happened inside Tunisia next. Even though the country had become ground zero of the Arab Spring, its transition was quickly overshadowed by events in more populous Arab countries with deeper ties to the United States and more patently cruel rulers. But nearly a decade on, Tunisia remains the only success story to have come out of the many uprisings. Across the Arab world, countries that looked as though they might follow in its footsteps have become mired in civil war, as has happened in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Others, such as Bahrain and Egypt, have returned to repression and authoritarianism. Tunisia, by contrast, has drafted a progressive constitution and held free and fair elections at the presidential, parliamentary and local levels. In July, when President Beji Caid Essebsi died at the age of 92, the transition to a caretaker government was smooth and unremarkable. Several problems persist and continue to hobble the country, in particular a long track record of economic mismanagement and a disconcerting lack of trust in public institutions. But for all the unfinished business Tunisia still faces, its example remains a source of hope across the region.

In achieving this feat, Tunisia has helped dispel the myth that Arab societies or Islam is not compatible with democracy. But the country’s story also offers lessons for beyond the Arab world: that transitions from authoritarianism require brave leaders willing to put country above politics and that such transitions are by nature chaotic and halting. For the international community, this means that states in transition should be offered the diplomatic and, above all, financial support they need to bear the growing pains of democracy and come away with as few scars as possible.

AFTERSHOCKS OF REVOLUTION
Postrevolutionary Tunisia inherited a state in disrepair. The Ben Ali regime had been notoriously corrupt. It plundered the country’s public coffers and stashed the money in bank accounts belonging to Ben Ali’s wife, Leila Trabelsi, and her family. The government favored certain coastal regions, neglecting the south and the interior of the country, from where the revolution would later emerge. Political competition was nonexistent, and potential challengers to Ben Ali’s ruling party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally, were either banned outright or forced to operate under restrictions so severe as to permanently keep them on the sidelines. Those who ran afoul of the regime were imprisoned and tortured.

Postrevolutionary Tunisia inherited a state in disrepair.

Leaving this dismal record behind was not easy, and in the first years after Ben Ali’s ouster, the country endured serious setbacks. Debates on the role of religion in public life were particularly divisive. Ben Ali’s regime had prided itself on its secular and progressive approach to women’s rights in a country where 99 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim. When a popular Islamist political movement, Ennahda, emerged in the 1980s, Ben Ali promptly banned it and imprisoned or exiled tens of thousands of its members. But when Tunisians voted for a constituent assembly to draft a new, postrevolutionary constitution in the fall of 2011—the country’s first-ever democratic election—Ennahda received the most votes of any party, setting up a fierce fight over the direction the transition. Among the most contentious issues was women’s standing in civic and political life. For Ennahda, women were “complementary” to men—but that term angered non-Islamists, who feared that writing it into the constitution would open a back door to gender discrimination. The critics eventually prevailed. But the constitution-drafting process had exposed painful cleavages within Tunisian society.

Ennahda’s win in the 2011 election allowed it to form a three-way governing alliance with two smaller, secular parties, imposing a semblance of order on the postrevolutionary chaos. But beneath the surface, the situation remained unstable, in part because many secularists were as afraid of Ennahda’s Islamist agenda as they were of a return to authoritarianism. In 2013, frustration with the Ennahda-led government culminated in a national crisis. In February of that year, Islamist extremists murdered the prominent leftist opposition leader Chokri Belaid. The assassination sparked mass protests, with many accusing the government of standing by in the face of violent extremism. The Tunisian General Labor Union, or UGTT, called its first general strike since 1978, bringing the country to a standstill for days. When another leftist leader, Mohamed Brahmi, was assassinated a few months later, more large-scale demonstrations followed. Protesters were now calling for the Constituent Assembly to dissolve.

The turmoil of 2013 could have easily derailed the entire transition process. That it did not was largely due to the work of four powerful civil society organizations—the UGTT, the country’s bar association, its largest employers’ association, and a human rights group—which came together for talks in the summer of 2013. The National Dialogue Quartet, as the group came to be known, represented constituencies with widely differing interests, but its members soon agreed on a path forward, calling for a new electoral law, a new prime minister and cabinet, and the adoption of the long-delayed constitution. It then mediated a national dialogue among the major political parties. The talks convinced Ennahda to step down and brought a new, technocratic government to power. The Quartet also helped the Constituent Assembly resolve sticking points in the new constitution, and in January 2014, the deputies passed the new text in a near-unanimous vote.

It would not be the last time that coalition building allowed postrevolutionary Tunisia to weather a moment of uncertainty. In late 2014, the country held its first-ever free parliamentary and presidential elections. The contest was fair, but turnout—48 percent of eligible voters for the legislative and 45 percent for the presidential election—was low for such a monumental event, suggesting that Tunisia was not the vibrant democracy many had hoped for. And the results seemed to set Tunisia up for further conflict. Essebsi, the presidential candidate with the most votes, was a staunch secularist and longtime member of the pre-revolutionary regime who had run on an explicitly anti-Ennahda platform. His party, Nidaa Tounes, was a loose coalition of non-Islamist parties and activists united in their opposition to the Islamist group and little else.

Essebsi therefore took Islamists and secularists alike by surprise when, shortly after the election, he formed a coalition with Ennahda. Essebsi, it soon emerged, had been meeting for secret talks with the Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi, a remarkable development, given that Essebsi had served as foreign minister under the regime that had imprisoned and tortured Ghannouchi. Their public rapprochement sent a powerful message to the public: the days of bitter political rivalries were in the past. A democratic Tunisia could accommodate leaders of all stripes—Islamists and secularists, conservatives and liberals.

Violent extremism, however, still punctuated the country’s progress. Terrorist attacks in early 2015, first at the National Bardo Museum, in downtown Tunis, and later at a beach resort in Sousse, killed a total of 60 people, most of them European tourists. The attacks were a significant blow to Tunisia’s tourism industry, which makes up around eight percent of the country’s GDP. They also shed light on the severity of Tunisia’s problem with Islamist fundamentalism. The chaos of the early transition years had made it difficult for the Tunisian government to clamp down on the recruitment of extremists, particularly in the country’s traditionally marginalized interior. And as democracy flourished without providing real change to the lives of Tunisians—the economy remained stagnant and unemployment high—many felt they had nothing to lose by joining the ranks of extremist groups. By 2015, Tunisia was infamous for being both the sole democracy in the Arab world and the top exporter to Iraq and Syria of foreign fighters for the Islamic State, or ISIS.

As the region’s only democracy, Tunisia is a target for jihadi terrorism.

To make matters worse, Tunisia shared a porous border with Libya, where a chaotic civil war had allowed ISIS to flourish. Without much hassle, Tunisian citizens could cross into Libya, train in ISIS camps there, and return to Tunisia to carry out attacks at home—as the perpetrators of the Bardo and Sousse attacks had done. To this day, extremists also hide out on the other side of the country, in the mountainous border area between Tunisia and Algeria, from where they periodically carry out small-scale attacks against Tunisian security forces. Thanks largely to Western assistance, the Tunisian state has greatly improved its counterterrorism capabilities. But as the region’s only democracy, Tunisia has a target painted on its back. This past summer, both al Qaeda and ISIS called for fighters to refocus their attention on the country.

Foreign assistance has helped the country in a number of areas, including counterterrorism, but it bears emphasizing that the main drive for change came from within. Before 2011, U.S. ties with Tunisia were as good as nonexistent. U.S. President Barack Obama came to power seeking a new beginning with the Muslim world and made clear that, unlike his predecessor, he had no intention of imposing democracy on the Arab world. But when grassroots-led democratic movements swept the region, the Obama administration was determined to protect them, at least initially. It threw its weight behind the protests, both rhetorically and financially. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tunisia less than two months after Ben Ali’s departure to emphasize U.S. support for the transition. U.S. bilateral assistance to Tunisia jumped from $15 million in 2009 to $26 million in 2011. Multilateral programs provided several hundred million dollars more, bringing the U.S. total to over $1.4 billion since 2011. (The Trump administration has tried to make dramatic cuts in each of its proposed budgets, in line with its effort to slash foreign aid globally, but consistent congressional support has kept aid for Tunisia steady.) The European Union and its member states also upped their support in the years following the revolution, providing $2.65 billion between 2011 and 2017.

Despite that assistance, Tunisia still faces several major obstacles. Youth unemployment hovers around 30 percent, and inflation is rising. Since the revolution, the suicide rate has nearly doubled, and close to 100,000 highly educated and skilled workers have left the country. Tunisia recently overtook Eritrea as the country with the largest number of migrants arriving in Italy by sea. To slow this trend and improve Tunisians’ economic prospects, the government will need to take some unpopular measures, such as cutting wages in the public sector. This will require confronting the powerful labor unions—in particular, the UGTT—which at times have effectively shut down the country with massive strikes. But inaction will only turn off international lenders and exacerbate the brain drain, mass emigration, and extremist recruitment.

Reforming sclerotic government institutions is another priority. The judiciary remains largely unreformed. Many judges are holdovers from the Ben Ali era, and the byzantine legal code is not always in line with the constitution. Most egregious, the country currently has no constitutional court, largely because lawmakers cannot agree on whom to appoint as judges. The first democratically elected parliament, in office from 2014 to October 2019, struggled mightily to pass legislation and suffered from severe absenteeism, with around half its members missing in action on any given day.

The most important item on the agenda is regaining the confidence of the Tunisian public. As of early 2019, only 34 percent of Tunisians trusted the president, and only 32 percent trusted their parliament, according to a poll by the International Republican Institute. When it comes to voicing their concerns, many of them, especially the young, prefer the streets over the ballot box. Around 9,000 protests are held each year, the majority of which originate in the same traditionally marginalized regions where the revolution started. This problem has no easy solution, but devolving greater powers to the local level would help. The country’s first-ever local elections, held in May 2018, were a step in the right direction. Not only did they introduce one of the most progressive gender-parity requirements of any electoral law globally, with 47 percent of local council seats going to women; they also opened the gates to young candidates, with 37 percent of the seats going to those under 35.

BUILDING THE SHIP AS IT SAILS
Tunisians are quick to point out that their country doesn’t provide a model that can be cut and pasted onto other national contexts. But their experience still holds important lessons about how to support democracy. For outsiders, the main takeaway is to keep one’s distance at first. Tunisia succeeded thanks not to the presence of a pro-democracy agenda led by other countries but to the absence of such an effort. The transition began with a grassroots call for change, which foreign donors and international partners later stepped in to support. This made it hard for the government to discredit the protests as a foreign-driven, neocolonialist project. Wherever possible, the United States and Europe should allow homegrown change to occur without premature interference. Once democratic transitions take root, outside governments should be quick to offer financial support and training. In places where change seems unlikely to emerge on its own, foreign donors should make use of conditional aid and provide larger pots of funds to countries that meet certain political and economic indicators. The Millennium Challenge Corporation and the European Union’s “more for more” principle, both of which reward countries for political and economic reform, are good examples of this approach.

Young democracies, for their part, can learn from Tunisia’s brand of consensus politics. Tunisia’s transition could well have failed in 2013 had two leaders, Essebsi and Ghannouchi, not put democracy and pluralism ahead of their own political ambitions. Budding democratic leaders are often tempted to fall into autocratic patterns of behavior and promote their own agendas by hoarding power. In the early stages of a democratic transition, however, leaders need to share political space and prioritize pluralism over exclusion, such that once the situation has stabilized, there is enough room for healthy political competition.

Young democracies can learn from Tunisia’s brand of consensus politics. Likewise, democracies in the making should heed the cautionary tale of Tunisia’s gridlocked Constituent Assembly. For its first three years, the new government in Tunis operated without a constitution to guide its actions. And today, almost six years after the constitution’s ratification, much of it has not been implemented. Several of the bodies it mandates, such as a constitutional court, remain to be formed. Tunisia is building the democratic ship as it sails, which has led to public frustration and confusion. Transitioning countries would be well served by clearly establishing the rules of the game from the outset and developing an efficient and realistic timeline for forming the crucial institutions to make democracy work.

There are limits, however, to what one can learn from Tunisia. In particular, its experience offers no satisfying answer about how to sequence political and economic reforms. Leaders in Tunis chose to focus first on political renewal, drafting a new constitution, holding elections, and creating political institutions. Doing so has left the economy moribund—and the country with a broken social contract. For many Tunisians, the new regime has not delivered the dignity they demanded in 2010, and as a result, the public distrusts the new democratic institutions. But trying to fix the economy before taking on the challenge of political reform could have backfired, too. There was no guarantee that once the economy improved, transitional leaders would have remained committed to democratic reform. Ultimately, economic challenges are inevitable during democratic transitions, and the only viable solution may be for outsiders to provide a stronger safety net through loan guarantees, budget support, and foreign direct investment in the hope of maintaining public support for democracy.

Tunisia is a beacon of hope for pro-democracy movements across the Middle East, but even for the region’s many autocrats, the country’s successful democratic transition is more than just a cautionary tale—for there are worse fortunes they could face. Ben Ali’s forced retirement in Saudi Arabia may not strike them as enviable—but it must certainly seem preferable to the fates of some who refused to bow out, be it death at the hands of insurgents (Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi); seeing one’s country be plunged into years of civil war, devastation, and economic disaster (Syria’s Bashar al-Assad); or both (Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh). These divergent fortunes will loom large in the minds of rulers if they are faced with mass protests today. As for the region’s many activists, Tunisia offers a safe haven that is far more accessible than Europe or the United States—and an example of Arab democracy to emulat

Since the 9/11 attacks, the Arab world’s relative economic, social, and political underdevelopment has been a topic of near-constant international concern. In a landmark 2002 report, the UN Development Program (UNDP) concluded that Arab countries lagged behind much of the world in development indicators such as political freedom, scientific progress, and the rights of women. Under U.S. President George W. Bush, this analysis helped drive the “freedom agenda,” which aimed to democratize the Middle East—by force if necessary—in order to eradicate the underdevelopment and authoritarianism that some officials in Washington believed were the root causes of terrorism. Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, criticized one of the cornerstones of the freedom agenda—the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003—but he shared Bush’s diagnosis. In his first major foreign policy speech as president, delivered in Cairo in 2009, Obama called on Middle Eastern governments to make progress in democracy, religious freedom, gender equality, and “economic development and opportunity.” Implicit in his remarks was a widely shared view among Western observers of the Middle East: that the Arab world’s dysfunction was a product of social and political arrangements that thwarted human potential, furthered inequality, and favored a small elite to the detriment of the broader population.

During the first decade of this century, progress was slow. Under the surface, however, discontent was rising. This discontent culminated in the protests of 2010–11, commonly known as the Arab Spring. In countries as diverse as Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia, ordinary citizens took to the streets to challenge their authoritarian rulers and demand dignity, equality, and social justice. For a moment, it seemed as if change had finally arrived in the Middle East.

The situation in the Middle East looks even worse than it did before the Arab Spring.
Yet in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, development stalled. Although some countries, such as Tunisia, were able to consolidate democratic systems, authoritarian leaders in much of the region successfully counterattacked. In Egypt, the military led a coup in 2013 to depose the democratically elected government; in Libya and Syria, dictators responded to peaceful protests with violence, precipitating brutal civil wars that turned into international proxy conflicts. Even in countries that did not descend into violence, autocrats clamped down on dissent and poured resources into suppressing their own people and undermining democratic transitions across the Middle East. Meanwhile, progress on the human development indicators prioritized by both international experts and U.S. policymakers either stagnated or went into reverse.

Today, nearly ten years later, the situation in the Middle East looks even worse than it did before the Arab Spring. Political repression is more onerous. Economic growth is sluggish and unequal. Corruption remains rampant. Gender equality is more aspiration than reality.

Yet something fundamental has changed. Arab governments have traditionally rested on what political scientists call an “authoritarian bargain,” in which the state provides jobs, security, and services in exchange for political loyalty. This bargain is based on the assumption that ordinary people will remain passive. But today, that assumption no longer holds. Citizens no longer fear their governments. Now more than ever before, ordinary people across the Middle East are politically engaged and willing to voice dissent. And as the massive protest movements in Algeria and Sudan earlier this year showed, they remain willing to take to the streets to demand a better future, even in the face of repression. The Arab Spring may not have ushered in the immediate reforms that many had hoped for, but in the long run, it may have accomplished something more important: awakening the political energies of the Arab world and setting in motion the long process of Arab revitalization.

Petrofac has been awarded a contract by Waha Oil Company (WOC) to produce a Front-End Engineering Design (FEED) for its Gialo III field, onshore Libya.

The work will be executed over a schedule of 41 weeks and will support WOC’s planned programme of development over the coming years.

Petrofac has also been awarded a four-month conceptual and pre-FEED study for the rehabilitation of the Dahra Oil Field in Concession 32, onshore Libya.

The scope covers upstream facilities including well sites, flowlines, process plant and export pipelines. The ultimate client is Waha and Petrofac has formed a Project Joint Venture with Taknia to execute the work.

All three contracts will be executed by Petrofac’s Engineering & Consultancy Services (ECS) business in Woking, UK.

Nick Shorten, Managing Director, Petrofac Engineering and Production Services West, said:

“We are delighted to have secured these engineering contracts to support clients in our core markets in the Middle East and North Africa.

“These awards demonstrate how our high-end consultancy and front-end engineering expertise can support our clients in unlocking complex projects.”

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) International Operations Division Chief Leo Lin returned a sixth century marble statue known as the “Head of a Veiled Woman,” during a repatriation ceremony at the Libyan Embassy, Thursday.

“As a federal law enforcement agency with a global reach, HSI is a leader in investigating crimes involving the illicit importation and distribution of cultural proper and art,” said Lin. “The theft and trafficking of another country’s priceless and irreplaceable national treasures is a global concern and this case shows that HSI is working every day to deny criminals the financial incentives that motivates their behavior.”
The return of the statue was the culmination of an 11-year investigation led by HSI New York’s Cultural Property, Arts and Antiquities Unit, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

In June 2008, HSI New York initiated a cultural property investigation in response to information indicating that looted antiquities were shipped to the United States from Dubai. The investigation revealed an antiquities dealer illegally shipped 50 items of cultural property originating from various nations to major museums, galleries and art houses in New York City.

In August 2008, HSI seized the Libyan marble statue during its shipment from the Dubai-based antiquities dealer to a collector in Queens, New York. The seized statue is the fragmented head of a veiled woman statue that is measured 13 inches tall by 10 inches wide. Ongoing efforts in this investigation led to the identification of several key players in a transnational criminal organization, engaging in the illicit trafficking of cultural antiquities.

Thursday’s repatriation marks the first reparation ceremony between Libya and the United States.

“In today’s world, we face complex challenges where the looting of artifacts requires cooperation and understanding between nations. It is of vital importance to continue this relationship between Libya and the United States in order to preserve the cultural fabric of countries that are in danger of cultural racketeering,” said Libyan’s U.S. Ambassador Wafa Bugaighis.

Per Bugaughis, the statue originated in the ancient city of Cyrene, Eastern Libya, and is part of the rich cultural heritage amongst the Libyan community.

In February 2018, Libya signed a historical memorandum of understanding with the United States to protect Libya’s cultural property from illegal smuggling and highlight the principle that culture truly unites people.

With the signing of this agreement, reinforcing the fabric of shared history between countries, the United States and Libya have built a bridge of understanding, overcoming the forces of discord that threaten to divide our world.

HSI’s International Operations, through its 77 offices in 51 countries, works closely with foreign governments to conduct joint investigations, and is committed to pursuing a strategy to combat transnational organized crime related to the illicit trafficking of cultural artifacts by targeting high-priority organizations and strengthening international law enforcement partnerships.

ICE has recovered and returned approximately 12,000 artifacts to more than 30 countries since 2007, including paintings from France, Germany, Poland and Austria; cultural artifacts from China and Cambodia; dinosaur fossils from Mongolia; and illuminated manuscript left from Italy; a pair of royal Korean seals, ancient Peruvian ceramics, and most recently, an ancient gold coffin repatriated to Egypt.

Despite increasingly aggressive enforcement efforts to prevent the theft of cultural heritage and other antiquities, the illicit movement of such items across international borders continues to challenge global law enforcement efforts to reduce the trafficking of such property. Trafficking in antiquities is estimated to be a multi-billion-dollar transnational criminal enterprise.

Members of the public who have information about the illicit distribution of cultural property, as well as the illegal trafficking of artwork, are urged to call the toll-free tip line at 1-866-DHS-2-ICE or to complete the online tip form.

(Source: US Embassy)

Tim Eaton has written an article for the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House), entitled “Libya – Rich in Oil, Leaking Fuel“.

In it, he says that the oil-rich country is supposed to provide cheap, subsidized fuel to its citizens.

But amid continuing violence and instability, up to one-third goes missing from official supply chains each year, fuelling a black market that ultimately steals from state coffers at the expense of the population.

. 33 strikes examined in first detailed investigation on both sides of the frontline
. More than 100 civilians killed and injured; 100,000 displaced
. UN arms embargo violations by UAE, Turkey and others fuel potential war crimes
Warring parties in the ongoing battle for Tripoli have killed and maimed scores of civilians by launching indiscriminate attacks and using a range of inaccurate explosive weapons in populated urban areas, Amnesty International said in a new report today.

In the first in-depth field investigation across the frontline since fighting broke out on 4 April, the organization visited 33 air and ground strike sites in Tripoli and surrounding areas. It unearthed evidence of potential war crimes by both the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA), who have been fighting in and around the city.

Our on-the-ground investigation on both sides of the frontline revealed a systematic disregard for international law fuelled by the continued supply of weapons to both sides in violation of a UN arms embargo.

“Our on-the-ground investigation on both sides of the frontline revealed a systematic disregard for international law fuelled by the continued supply of weapons to both sides in violation of a UN arms embargo,” said Donatella Rovera, Senior Crisis Response Adviser at Amnesty International.

“Scores of civilians have been killed and injured as both sides use everything from Gaddafi-era unguided rockets to modern drone-launched guided missiles in attacks that could amount to war crimes,” said Brian Castner, Amnesty International’s Senior Crisis Adviser on Arms and Military Operations.

First investigation on both sides of Tripoli frontline
Amnesty International investigators were on the ground in Libya from 1 to 14 August, and visited both sides of the conflict in and around Tripoli, Tajoura, Ain Zara, Qasr Bin Ghashir and Tarhouna. They interviewed 156 residents, including survivors, witnesses and relatives of victims, as well as local officials, medical workers and members of militias.

Amnesty International experts in remote sensing, weapons and ordnance, photographic and video verification, and members of its Digital Verification Corps also carried out an open source investigation into many of the strikes.

GNA and LNA officials have not responded to questions Amnesty International sent about their strikes.

Civilians caught in the crossfire
According to UN statistics, the fighting over the last six months has killed and wounded more than 100 civilians – including dozens of detained migrants and refugees – and has displaced more than 100,000. Air strikes, artillery barrages and shelling have struck civilian homes and other key infrastructure, including several field hospitals, a school, and a migrant detention centre, and have forced the closure of the Mitiga airport, Tripoli’s sole international air link.

Some of the attacks documented by Amnesty International were either indiscriminate or disproportionate – meaning they violated fundamental principles of international humanitarian law and could amount to war crimes. In other cases, the presence of fighters at or near civilian homes and medical facilities endangered civilians there.

Children as young as two years old playing outside their homes, mourners attending a funeral, and ordinary people going about their daily activities were among those unlawfully killed or injured.

“What kind of war is this, killing civilians, families, in their homes? What can we do? May God help us,”

It was part of an indiscriminate attack launched by the LNA on the Abu Salim neighbourhood just before 11pm on 16 April, 2019. The salvo of six notoriously inaccurate ground-launched “Grad” rockets rained down over several city blocks, killing eight civilians, injuring at least four more, and leaving the survivors badly traumatized.

A GNA artillery attack on the densely populated civilian neighbourhood of Qasr bin Ghashir at around 12.15pm on 14 May, 2019, hit a three-storey building, killing at least five civilians and injuring more than a dozen. Many people were moving about the area at the time to attend the funeral of a well-known neighbour.

“I was at home and my brother was standing outside on the street. The strike was massive; it sent a vehicle flying on top of another vehicle and for a moment everything was black. I rushed outside and there were many neighbours dead and injured on the ground; there were severed body parts. It was a shocking sight. Then we found my brother; he had injuries everywhere; he died. I couldn’t believe it,” the brother of 19-year-old Ahmad Fathi al-Muzughi, who died in the strike, told Amnesty International.

GNA air strikes in Qasr Bin Ghashir and Tarhouna have also hit civilian homes and infrastructure, utilizing FAB-500ShL unguided “parachute” bombs. With a blast radius of over 800m, this weapon is completely inappropriate for use in urban areas.

Airport and field hospitals attacked
Mitiga Airport – for months Tripoli’s only functioning airport – is now closed after being repeatedly targeted by LNA attacks. Nearby civilian homes and a school have also been struck in what appear to be indiscriminate attacks. Amnesty International experts examined craters and munitions fragments at several of these strike sites, pointing to the use of unguided, large explosive weapons.

LNA attacks have also damaged or destroyed several ambulances and field hospitals used to treat wounded fighters. Medical workers and facilities – including those treating sick or wounded fighters – have special protection under international humanitarian law and should not be targeted. Amnesty International has found that GNA fighters have used field hospitals and medical facilities for military purposes, thereby rendering them vulnerable to attacks.

The deadliest such attack was a missile strike on a field hospital near the closed Tripoli International Airport on 27 July 2019 that killed five medics and rescuers and injured eight more. Based on Blue Arrow 7 munition fragments found at the site and other evidence, Amnesty International determined that the strike was launched from a Chinese Wing Loong drone – which the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been operating on behalf of the LNA. The organization also established that the facility was not marked as a medical facility and had also been used by fighters for eating and other purposes.

UN arms embargo violated
Despite a comprehensive UN arms embargo in place since 2011, the UAE and Turkey have been supporting the LNA and GNA, respectively, through illicit arms transfers and direct military support.

“The international community must uphold the UN arms embargo, which Turkey, the UAE, Jordan and other countries have flagrantly violated,” said Brian Castner.

The international community must uphold the UN arms embargo, which Turkey, the UAE, Jordan and other countries have flagrantly violated.

“All sides must take immediate and concrete steps to protect civilians in line with the laws of war and investigate the conduct of their forces. A Commission of Inquiry should be put in place to pave the way for justice and reparation for the victims and their families,” said Donatella Rovera.

“Members of the UN Human Rights Council should work together to establish this mechanism as a matter of urgency, which could determine responsibility for violations and preserve evidence of crimes.”

The UN’s annual meetings have been the setting for historic – and sometimes historically comical – moments
In the Syrian play Cheers to the Homeland, the drunken main character Ghawar tells his father’s ghost that the Arab World is splintering further “to increase our votes at the United Nations [General] Assembly”.

The joke lamented the lack of unity of Arab states – and the fact that even with more votes, resolutions at the UN General Assembly are non-binding.

Yet despite its limited power, the UN annual summit continues to bring together the leaders of the world’s 193 internationally recognised states, making it the most inclusive branch of the UN.

And its annual meetings have been the setting for historic – and sometimes historically comical – moments.

As world leaders gather again in New York City for the UN General Assembly this week, MEE revisits six key moments that took place behind the UN podium.

1. Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi speaks for 100 minutes

In his first and only speech at the UN, the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi made up for lost time.

Gaddafi shattered the UN’s time limit of 15 minutes in 2009 when he delivered a 100-minute tirade in which he denounced the UN Security Council, defended Somali pirates and accused “capitalist companies” of producing viruses to sell medicine.

Gaddafi also called on the UN to open an investigative division to look into the assassinations of historical figures, including Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba, US President John F Kennedy and American civil rights icon Martin Luther King Jr.

The Libyan leader went on to promote a one-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – an idea he had outlined in a 2000 manifesto known as the White Book.

“This conflict poisons the world. The White Book actually has the solution; I hold it here,” said Gaddafi, brandishing the book before tossing it in the direction of then-UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. “The solution is Isratine. Arabs have no hostility or animosity towards Israel.”

There was plenty of criticism to go around in the speech, but the colonel reserved his harshest words for the UN Security Council, blaming it for dozens of wars that killed millions of people.

Gaddafi said the council was tyrannical in nature because it gives five veto-holding countries oversized influence over global affairs. The Libyan leader also suggested transferring the Security Council’s powers to the more inclusive General Assembly.

“At present, the Security Council is security feudalism, political feudalism for those who have permanent seats… It should not be called the Security Council; it should be called the terror council,” Gaddafi said.

During his stay in New York, Gaddafi erected his infamous tent – in which he would stay with his all-female security detail – on a property owned by Donald Trump in the suburb of Bedford. But after the speech, Trump, then a New York businessman, asked the Libyan leader to leave his estate. Gaddafi also had a request to pitch his tent in New York’s Central Park denied.

2. Diplomats walk out on Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Over his eight years as Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was at the centre of several controversies that grabbed international headlines. His maiden UN address in 2005 was no different, with Ahmadinejad stressing that all nations, including Iran, have a right to nuclear energy.

“We believe that all countries and nations are entitled to technological and scientific advancement in all fields, particularly the peaceful technology to produce nuclear fuel,” he said at the time. “Such access cannot be restricted to a few.”

The 2005 speech set a defiant tone that would become characteristic of the Iranian president’s UN General Assembly appearances, which sparked walkouts on two occasions.

While his speeches were critical of global economic inequality and promoted Iran as a real democracy, in 2007 Ahmedinejad prompted global condemnation for questioning what happened during the Holocaust and casting doubt over the US account of the 9/11 attacks.

Speaking at New York’s Columbia University on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly that year, the Iranian president raised questions about the Nazis’ mass extermination campaign that targeted the Jewish people and left six million people dead during World War II.

“I am not saying that it didn’t happen at all,” he said. “This is not the judgment that I am passing here. Granted this happened, what does it have to do with the Palestinian people?”

In the same speech, Ahmedinejad became the subject of ridicule for saying that there are no gay people in Iran. And during his time in New York, he was barred from laying a wreath at Ground Zero, the site of the World Trade Center building that was destroyed during the 9/11 attacks.

In 2010, European and American diplomats walked out during Ahmedinejad’s UN speech, after he floated a conspiracy theory that “some segments within the US government orchestrated the [9/11] attack”.

A year later, delegates walked out again when the Iranian leader repeated his scepticism about 9/11 and the Holocaust. “By using their imperialistic media network, which is under the influence of colonialism, they threaten anyone who questions the Holocaust and the September 11 event with sanctions and military actions,” Ahmadinejad said at the time.

3. Benjamin Netanyahu’s red marker

On the UN General Assembly stage in 2012, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu drew a literal red line on Iran’s nuclear programme – with a marker.

Holding a poster displaying a cartoon bomb with a fuse, Netanyahu said Tehran could be months – if not weeks – away from building a nuclear weapon should it be allowed to continue uranium enrichment.

“The red line should be drawn right here,” said Netanyahu, his marker screeching as he dragged it back and forth near a line marked 90 percent, “before Iran completes the second stage of nuclear enrichment necessary to make a bomb – before Iran gets to a point where it’s a few months away or a few weeks away from amassing enough enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon.”

Netanyahu’s theatrics were also seen as a critique of then-US President Barack Obama, who had refused to set a red line on Iran’s nuclear programme that would lead to military strikes.

To the Israeli leader’s dismay, three years later, Obama and multiple other world leaders signed an agreement with Iran to restrict the country’s nuclear programme in exchange for lifting international sanctions against its economy. Donald Trump pulled the US out of the agreement in May 2018, but Netanyahu has continued to ring alarm bells about Iran’s nuclear programme.

Earlier this month, Netanyahu accused Iran of razing a nuclear site where he said Tehran had been building an atomic weapon – and he once again used visual props to make his point.

“In this site, Iran conducted experiments to develop nuclear weapons,” Netanyahu said in a televised speech, standing in front of a projected grainy photo of buildings surrounded by hills.

Netanyahu – and his posters – will not make it to the assembly this year; he cancelled his trip to New York to oversee the political impasse that followed the Israeli elections, which did not produce a clear winner for the country’s premiership.

4. George W Bush tries to sell the war in Iraq

In 2002, one day after the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks in New York, then-President George W Bush dedicated most of his address at the UN General Assembly to berating Iraq. Emphasising what turned out to be lies about Saddam Hussein’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and ties to al-Qaeda, the US president urged other countries to “stand up” for global security.

He warned that failure to act against Hussein would lead to “far greater horrors” than 9/11, as he accused Baghdad of developing “terrible weapons” that it may supply to its “terrorist allies”. Bush went so far as to say that Iraq is not far from being able to build a nuclear bomb.

“Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon,” Bush said. “Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year.”

In his quest to denounce Hussein, Bush also cited Iraq’s US-backed war with Iran in the 1980s as one of the many conflicts started by the Iraqi leader.

Less than a year later, the US-led invasion of Iraq began, Hussein was toppled, and his statue in Baghdad’s Firdos Square was destroyed after US troops covered it with an American flag. But with widespread sectarian bloodshed, rampant corruption and the rise of militants, including the Islamic State (IS) group, Iraq’s post-Hussein future was far from the rosy picture Bush envisioned in his 2002 speech.

“If we meet our responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can arrive at a very different future. The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity… inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world,” Bush said at the time.

5. Chavez bemoans ‘the devil’ for destruction in Middle East

When the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez took the UN stage in 2006, he spoke of a lingering smell of sulphur from “the devil” who had been at the same podium a day earlier.

It was not Lucifer nor any other fallen angel; rather, Chavez, a critic of Israel who aligned himself with the government of Cuba and Iran, was referring to the US president at the time – George W Bush.

“Yesterday, the devil came here, right here, right here,” Chavez said, drawing a cross on his chest then joining his hands in prayer. “And it smells of sulphur still today, this table that I am now standing in front of.”

Chavez went on to admonish US foreign policy, accusing Bush of talking “as the owner of the world” in an attempt to consolidate a global dictatorship.

He zeroed in on the US’s policies in Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon, in particular. Only weeks before his address, the Israeli army launched a military assault on Lebanon that in just over a month left more than 1,000 civilians dead, ravaged villages and destroyed key infrastructure.

“The government of the United States doesn’t want peace. It wants to exploit its system of exploitation, of pillage, of hegemony through war. It wants peace, but what’s happening in Iraq? What happened in Lebanon? Palestine? What’s happening?” Chavez said at the UNGA podium that September.

“What’s happened over the last 100 years in Latin America and in the world? And now threatening Venezuela. New threats against Venezuela, against Iran.”

6. The world laughs at Trump – and he attacks Iran

At the UN, leaders often call for cooperation and the end of conflicts, address global problems, or talk up their nation’s role in the world. But in the opening remarks of his second address to the world body in 2018, Donald Trump found it fit to promote his own domestic achievements in typical superlative fashion.

“In less than two years, my administration has accomplished more than almost any administration in the history of our country. America’s – so true,” Trump said, prompting laughter from the heads of state and diplomats who filled the room.

The US president then chuckled. “I did not expect that reaction, but that is ok,” he said, prompting even more laughter.

Trump would go on to rage against globalism and emphasise his “America first” worldview, which critics say underpins the White House’s reluctance to call out human rights abuses around the world. “America is governed by Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism, and we embrace the doctrine of patriotism,” Trump said.

Despite stressing a version of global politics in which states are free to pursue their own interests and handle their internal affairs without international interference, Trump freely criticised Iran, calling it a “dictatorship”.

“The Iranian people are rightly outraged that their leaders have embezzled billions of dollars from Iran’s treasury, seized valuable portions of the economy, and looted the people’s religious endowments, all to line their own pockets and send their proxies to wage war,” he said.